Introduction
Public disclosure of firms' environmental performance has been characterized as the "third wave" of environmental regulation, after command-and-control and market-based approaches (Tietenberg, 1998) . Its growing popularity stems from initial evidence that disclosure has reduced emissions in North America and Southeast Asia, 2 as well as the perception that it is a low-cost regulatory option because it does not require formal enforcement procedures. China's State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) has become interested in public disclosure because China's pollution problem remains severe, despite long-standing attempts to control it with traditional regulatory instruments.
Chinese regulators have also been influenced by the rapid spread of pollution disclosure systems to other Asian countries after pilot programs were initiated by Indonesia and Philippines in 1995 (World Bank, 1999) . As a result, China has begun pilot experiments with "third wave" regulation. Since late 1998, supported by the World Bank's InfoDev Program, the authors have been working with China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) to establish GreenWatch, a public disclosure program for polluters. Adapted from Indonesia's PROPER, the GreenWatch program rates firms' environmental performance from best to worst in five colorsgreen, blue, yellow, red and black. The ratings are disseminated to the public through the media. Two municipal-level pilot GreenWatch programs have been implemented, in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province, and Hohhot, Inner Mongolia. Reaction to the pilot programs has been positive, and Jiangsu Province has decided to promote province-wide 2 For evidence on toxic emissions reduction in the US, see Konar and Cohen (1996) and Tietenberg and Wheeler (2001) . The impact of disclosure on two water pollutants (biochemical oxygen demand and suspended solids) has been analyzed for Canada (Foulon, Lanoie and Laplante, 2000) , Indonesia (Afsah and Vincent, 1997) and Philippines (World Bank, 1999) .
implementation of GreenWatch. SEPA currently plans to launch pilot programs in other areas, in preparation for nationwide implementation of public disclosure.
This paper describes China's GreenWatch program, its results to date, and the implications for national adoption of public disclosure. In Section 2, we discuss the role of disclosure in China's approach to environmental management. Sections 3 and 4 describe the Zhenjiang and Hohhot programs, respectively. Section 5 summarizes the lessons learned to date from the GreenWatch experience, and Section 6 provides further discussion of the use of information strategies for pollution management.
Industrial Pollution Control in China

China's Industrial Pollution Problem
China's industrial growth has been extremely rapid during the period of economic reform. In the 1990's, the output of the country's millions of industrial enterprises has increased by more than 15% annually. While industry has helped lift tens of millions of people out of poverty, its polluting emissions have also produced serious environmental damage. Recent research (Bolt, et al., 2001) suggests that China's air pollution problem is the worst in the world. With over 300,000 premature deaths per year, China accounts for over 40% of the total for the developing world --more than twice the number for South Asia, which has a comparable population. Similar percentages characterize other measures of health damage.
Chinese industry is a primary source of this problem. China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) estimates that in 2000, industry accounted for about 40% of the nation's water pollution, and about 80% of its air pollution. For this reason, SEPA has continuously declared control of industrial pollution to be one of the top priorities for Chinese regulators.
During the past decade, conventional regulation has probably saved millions of lives by helping hold the growth rate of total emissions well below the growth rate of industry. However, the continuing severity of pollution has led the Chinese government to experiment with public pollution disclosure as a possible complement to existing measures.
The Role of Public Disclosure in Chinese Industrial Pollution Control
Traditional command-and-control approaches and economic instruments have been widely employed in Chinese environmental management. However, the enforcement of those policy instruments has generally been weak (World Bank, 2001) . Previous experience in the US, Indonesia and elsewhere has demonstrated that public disclosure of environmental performance can promote regulatory compliance for several reasons.
First, disclosure provides an additional incentive for improved performance because many companies value their public image. Second, ratings provide a valuable environmental management tool for enterprises, which in many cases have never undertaken a comprehensive assessment of their environmental performance.
Third, public disclosure can strengthen the regulatory institutions themselves. In most cases, Chinese regulators already have the information needed for public rating of environmental performance. Many agencies receive regular, facility-level reports on emissions, pollution control investments, field inspections and accidents. However, public disclosure can significantly raise the ante by pressuring regulators toward more accurate and timely record-keeping. With its credibility on the line in a disclosure program, a regulatory agency has a strong incentive to maintain high internal standards. This is particularly true for emissions monitoring, which provides the foundation for an environmental performance rating system.
Fourth, disclosure encourages public participation in environmental regulation.
Insufficient access to environmental information is a major reason for the weakness of public participation in China's environmental management (Wang et al, 2002) . Public performance ratings make it much easier for concerned citizens to identify serious polluters and pressure them to improve their performance.
Finally, the experiences of Hohhot Municipality and Zhenjiang City suggest that disclosure also changes the balance of environmental initiative between polluters and regulators. Prior to disclosure in these areas, local enterprises generally resisted regulators' attempts to monitor them more closely. After disclosure attracted widespread publicity through the news media, however, companies perceived an impact on their public image and the market image of their products. Enterprises that improved their performance immediately requested new monitoring reports, so that their public ratings could be improved as well. Enterprises with poor ratings shifted from passive resistance to active solicitation of inspections, as a means of improving their ratings. At the same time, enterprises with good ratings felt continued pressure to maintain their environmental performance, to avoid complaints from the public about backsliding.
Support for Disclosure in China
Although public ratings are relatively new in China, there is ample legal, social, technical and institutional support for disclosure.
Legal support
Chinese law provides ample precedent for the use of public disclosure to control 
Social support
In the information age, public opinion has proven to be a powerful force in every society. This force is best mobilized by the major print and broadcast media, since their content is easily understood by the public. In 1997, the Chinese Central Television
Program disclosed non-compliance by some polluters in the Huai River Basin. As a result, both the polluters and the local authorities came under great pressure to improve their performance. Currently, environmental protection ranks high among the concerns of urban residents. In 1999, the Social Survey Institute of China (SSIC) surveyed the public-agenda priorities of households in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Wuhan and other cities. The survey covered issues related to corruption, law enforcement, inflation, equity and environmental protection. Corrup tion was the primary concern, followed by environmental protection, with 66% of households rating the latter as very important. Given this concern, social support for public disclosure of environmental information should be strong
Technical support
Accurate information provides the essential foundation for public ratings of environmental performance. Accuracy, in turn, depends on the quality of informationgathering technology, and on the reliability of record-keeping by the authorities. After establishment of the national task force on environmental monitoring 20 years ago, China has been making significant progress on this front. At present, there are over 4,800 environmental monitoring units in China, employing over 60,000 people. The current system uses standardized monitoring equipment, deployed to cover both the ambient environment and polluting emissions. It is overseen by over 3,600 environmental supervision units, with a working staff of over 26,000 people.
Institutional precedents
Although comprehensive public disclosure is new in China, the government has 
Potential barriers
The most important resistance to environmental performance disclosure programs in China may come from local go vernments. Chinese leaders in the central government have strongly supported the public disclosure strategy. In 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji stated explicitly that no environmental information should be kept secret. SEPA's minister, Mr. Xie Zhenhua, has also expressed strong support for environmental performance disclosure. However, some local governments have resisted on the grounds that disclosure may threaten local employment by reducing polluters' profits. In addition, some may be concerned about the additional administrative costs imposed by disclosure programs. Finally, local authorities may simply worry about whether they can implement such programs effectively, and how disclosure may affect relations between local companies and communities. Under these circumstances, financial support from provincial or national authorities may be needed to underwrite the startup costs for local disclosure programs.
Public Disclosure in Zhenjiang
Program Design
Zhenjiang is located in Jiangsu, a rela tively high-income province whose GDP per capita was US$2,300 in 1999. Zhenjiang's Environmental Information Disclosure
Program reflects design principles that have proven successful in previous disclosure programs in Indonesia and the Philippines. First, the performance rating system is simple, so that its implications can be easily understood and accepted by firms and the public.
Second, it identifies both superior and inferior performance. Finally, the ratings are color-coded for easy communication by the broadcast and print media.
The system divides industrial firms' environmental performance into five symmetric rating categories, with two (black, red) denoting inferior performance; one (yellow) denoting compliance with minimum emission regulations but failure to comply with stricter requirements; and two ratings (blue, green) denoting superior performance.
Because it recognizes three performance levels for firms that comply with basic emission requirements, the system provides incentives for continuous improvement. Even for noncompliant firms, the system rewards efforts to improve by recognizing two levels of performance.
Performance Ratings
The program's color-coded ratings are generated by a detailed accounting of environmental performa nce, whose major elements are summarized in Table 1 . The ratings system draws on four principle sources of information: reports on industrial firms' polluting emissions; inspection reports on their environmental management; records of public complaints, regulatory actions and penalties; and surveys that record characteristics of the firms that are relevant for rating environmental performance.
Compliance with regulations
The rating system incorporates six dimensions of environmental pollution: water, air, noise, solid waste, electromagnetic radiation, and radioactive contamination. It includes emissions information for 13 regulated air and water pollutants: chemical oxygen demand, suspended solids, oil, volatile hydroxybenzene, chromium, cyanide, lead, arsenic, mercury, cadmium, flue dust, industrial dust and sulfur dioxide. Pollutant discharges are rated by total quantity and concentration. Solid wastes are rated in three dimensions: production, disposal, and recycling.
Management behavior
This ele ment involves a detailed accounting of behavior in several dimensions. 
Social impact
Indicators in this category include the firm's record with respect to public complaints, pollution accidents, illegal pollution, and administrative penalties.
Program Implementation
Ratings construction
The Zhenjiang rating system uses a series of yes/no questions to translate its multidimensional performance indicators into 5 color codes. Figure 1 shows how this is done, while Table 1 provides a detailed accounting by category. Initially-selected firms were enterprises classified as large on the basis of plant size, production value and reported pollution discharge load. Subsequently, the program has expanded to cover smaller firms. The Zhenjiang Environmental Protection Burean (EPB) uses its own records to develop information on the firms' polluting emissions, management behavior and social impacts.
Disclosure process
A distinctive feature of the rating-disclosure process is its "Inform-Respond-CheckDisclose" reciprocal mechanism, in which industrial firms can exchange comments about their ratings with the EPB prior to disclosure. By reconsidering and rechecking at the firms' request, the EPB encourages (but is not required to gain) their acceptance of the final ratings, as well as promoting a more detailed environmental accounting by the firms themselves. After setting the ratings, the EPB sends them to the program's Steering
Board for final checking and ratification prior to public disclosure. The Steering Board is led by the deputy mayor in charge of environmental protection, and its members come from the EPB and other relevant administrative departments and institutions. Its main responsibility is to ratify the ratings and transmit them to the firms and the news media.
To ensure accurate press reports, the EPB invites reporters to a detailed presentation of the program, including an explanation of the rating system and a demonstration of the computer program that is used for ratings development.
operate (third synchronization) pollution control facilities simultaneously with the principal part of the enterprise's production activities.
Pilot ratings
The pilot program began in June, 1999, with selection and rating of 101 firms drawn from several industry sectors. During the pilot phase, the Zhenjiang EPB regularly reported its progress to the municipal government and the media. The firms were informed of their pilot ratings in 1998. Ten firms were de-listed during this initial period because of data quality problems, leaving 91 firms for disclosure. The latter accounted for 95% of measured pollution emissions in Zhenjiang, as well as 65% of the city's economic output.
The pilot ratings, displayed in Figure 2a , indicated widespread deficiencies, with 69% of the firms rated as Yellow, Red or Black. However, 31% demonstrated superior performance even in the pilot disclosure period, and a few earned the highest (Green) rating.
Public disclosure
In Industrial environmental performance in Zhenjiang improved significantly after combined implementation of OCDA and public disclosure. As a result, the disclosure program Steering Board announced its support for annual disclosures.
Public Disclosure in Hohhot
Program Design
Hohhot is located in Inner Mongolia Autonomous District, a northern, relatively poor region of China whose GDP per capita was US$1,100 in 1999. Hohhot's regulatory capacity is less-developed than Zhenjiang's, so its disclosure program is designed for cost-effective implementation in a relatively weak institutional setting. In Hohhot, the program focuses on firms that meet three criteria: major contributions to local pollution; management with some independence of action; and possible susceptibility to public pressure for improvement. To maximize the incentive effects of disclosure, the ratings standards are set to reveal a broad distribution of relative environmental performance.
The three design principles employed in Zhenjiang are also followed in Hohhot.
Performance ratings
Hohhot uses the same color ratings as Zhenjiang, ranging from green (best performance) through blue, yellow and red, to black (worst performance). Specific grading criteria are summarized in Figure 3 . The performance ratings cover only discharges and emissions of three major pollutants (COD for water; TSP and SO2 for air), along with the quality of plants' environmental management. Figure 3 shows that the ratings are much simpler in Hohhot than in Zhenjiang.
Ratings construction
In Hohhot, development of the ratings system coincided with meetings to build support for the concept from government agencies, the general public and the affected industry sectors. The assessment work utilized data collected by the Environmental Supervision Station of Hohhot City for the year 1999. Ratings were developed during the period December, 1998 to December, 1999, and several review meetings were conducted prior to official disclosure in March, 2000. As in Zhenjiang, a pilot ratings exercise was undertaken in consultation with affected enterprises before the ratings were disclosed to the public.
Program Implementation
On March 24, 2000, the Hohhot City government convened a news conference to disclose the environmental performance ratings to the public. Participants included the program development team, other government agencies, representatives from China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), and representatives from the 56 industrial enterprises and 51 other institutions that were rated. Major central and regional media also attended. Broadcast news programs featured stories about the disclosure for several days after the event.
As in the case of Zhenjiang, the evidence suggests that many polluters responded to public ratings of their environmental performance. After disclosure, large, persistent polluters such as the Hohhot Power Plant and the Hohhot Cement Mill repeatedly sent deputies to the Hohhot EPB to discuss how they could improve their ratings and made pollution abatement investments. As Figure 4 shows, the 56 industrial enterprises rated in Hohhot greatly improved their environmental performance during the period 1999 -2000. Enterprises rated Good or better increased from 24% to 62%, and enterprises in the worst (Black) category decreased from 11% to 5%. As in Zhenjiang, this improvement undoubtedly reflected pressure from both the OCDA and public disclosure programs.
Lessons Learne d
Experiments with environmental performance disclosure continue to expand in The evidence to date suggests that public disclosure of environmental performance can be an effective new component of China's system for regulating pollution.
Implementation should be feasible in most areas, because technical and design issues are not overly complex, and supporting expertise is available in almost every city of China.
With some training and consulting services, there should be no technical barrier to implementation of disclosure in the entire country. The case studies of Zhenjiang and Hohhot suggest that the costs of design and implementation are not high in China, since most of the necessary information already exists in the records of local Environmental Protection Bureaus. However, it might well be appropriate for China's highly-varied regions to institute ratings criteria and procedures that reflect their special circumstances.
The Zhenjiang and Hohhot experiences have also suggested a number of important lessons for successful implementation of disclosure in China. The first is that government support and involvement are critical. Only government can provide detailed and credible plant-level information for the public in China. The case studies also suggest that involvement of local government leaders is particularly important. Some municipal EPBs at this stage are not politically strong enough to disclose plant-level environmental performance without explicit support from the mayors or upper-level government agencies. In the two case studies, city mayors supported the program after lobbying from the local EPB and expressions of support from the central government.
Timing is also very important in this context. In both cities, the experience of pilot disclosure suggests that many enterprises will improve their performance prior to public disclosure, if they are informed of their ratings and given sufficient time to invest in pollution control. For public disclosure itself, intervals of one year between public ratings may strike a reasonable balance between the loss of public pressure over longer intervals and the higher cost of developing new ratings over shorter intervals.
Public disclosure clearly places unprecedented demands on environmental agencies' management information systems. Although there are substantial startup costs, the agencies realize large long-run gains from much more flexible, current and well-documented information systems. In this dimension, improved information management with public disclosure also yields substantial benefits for the implementation of conventional regulation.
The Zhenjiang and Hohhot experiences highlight the importance of several program design and implementation issues:
1. Selection of media and pollutants: This depends on the scope of local pollution problems, as well as the capacity of the implementing agency. Responding largely to the latter concern, Hohhot could only consider major water and air pollutants in the initial phase of its program. By contrast, Zhenjiang's institutional capacity and information base enabled it to include a large number of pollutants.
Selection of polluters: Whether program participation is mandatory or voluntary, it
should be governed by clear criteria that are consistent with the relevant legal statutes.
Thus far, programs have begun with mandatory participation of large polluters, and then expanded to cover smaller pollution sources.
3. Rating strategy: Ratings should be clear and easily communicated to the public, in order to mobilize continuous pressure on firms to improve their performance. The ratings parameters should be as objective as possible, and it is generally best to avoid constructing indices that assign varying weights to different parameters. The best and worst performance ratings should reflect commonly-understood principles. In both Zhenjiang and Hohhot, the worst rating has been assigned to firms whose emissions are both seriously non-compliant and very damaging to the environment. At the other end of the spectrum, the best rating goes to world-class performers that have earned ISO-14000 status.
4. Disclosure strategy: Key decisions in this context reflect technical, legal, social and political considerations. Characteristic problems include the choice of colors, the sequencing of pilot and public disclosure, how frequently to disclose, appropriate media strategy, etc.
5. Data quality: The credibility of public disclosure depends on the credibility of the information that is used for ratings construction. Therefore, an institutional decision to adopt disclosure is also a commitment to rigorous standards for collection, verification, storage and retrieval of information about polluters. For a disclosure program to be continuously effective, accurate data recording, processing and presentation are crucial.
6. Mobilizing stakeholder support: Strong disclosure programs require effective identification and mobilization of supporting constituencies. The underlying political and social factors are highly specific to each region.
7. Institutional arrangements: Differing local circumstances may dictate differing roles for governmental and non-governmental institutions in data collection, ratings construction, certification of accuracy, and pubic dissemination.
Discussion and Conclusions
Recent research has shown that public disclosure provides a promising complement to conventional regulation through several channels. The first is "informal regulation," or community pressure on polluters. Even low-income communities have proven willing and able to penalize polluters when information about their emissions is available.
Abundant evidence from Asia and Latin America shows that neighboring communities can strongly influence factories' environmental performance (e.g., Pargal and Wheeler, 1996) . Where formal regulators are present, communities use the political process to influence the strictness of enforcement. Where regulators are absent or ineffective, nongovernmental organizations and community groups apply pressure through a variety of channels, including religious institutions, social organizations, citizens' movements, and politicians. Although the channels vary from region to region, the pattern everywhere is similar: Factories negotiate directly with local actors in response to threats of social, political or physical sanctions if they fail to compensate the community or to reduce emissions.
Well-informed market agents can also play an important role in creating pressures for environmental protection. Bankers may refuse to extend credit because they are worried about environmental liability; consumers may avoid the products of firms that are known to be heavy polluters. The evidence suggests that multinational firms are important players in this context. These firms operate under close scrutiny from consumers and environmental organizations in the high-income economies. Investors also appear to play an important role in encouraging clean production. Heavy emissions may signal that a firm's production techniques are inefficient. Investors also weigh potential financial losses from regulatory penalties and liability settlements. Numerous studies suggest that stock markets in both developed and developing countries react significantly to environmental news ( Lanoie and Laplante, 1994; Hamilton, 1995; Lanoie et al., 1997; 3 Discharge meeting the load-based standards
(1) For firms holding a discharge permit, pollution discharge within the allowed limit; (2) For other firms, conformity with requirement 1 above ("discharge meeting the standard").
Illegal pollution
One or more instances of illegal pollution.
Pollution accidents
Level 1: One or more pollution accidents, each of which imposes economic losses between RMB 1,000 yuan and RMB 10,000 yuan.
Level 2 (any of the following):
(1) One pollution accident that imposes an economic loss between RMB 10,000 yuan and RMB 50,000 yuan; (2) Poisoning of employees ; (3) Pollution-induced conflict between the factory and the neighboring community; (4) Some environmental damage.
Level 3 (any of the following):
(1) One pollution accident that imposes an economic loss between RMB 50,000 yuan and RMB 100,000 yuan; (2) Radiation damage to employees; crippling of employees; (3) Poisoning of neighboring residents (4) Serious impact on social stability (5) Serious damage to the environment Level 4: One pollution accident that imposes an economic loss of RMB 100,000 yuan or more.
6 Timely payment of discharge fee
For eight months of the year, the discharge fee is paid within the stipulated twenty-day period. For the rest of the year, the fee is paid within two months. 
Public complaints
Validated complaints about pollution that has significant environmental impact.
13 Cleaner production Completion of a clean production audit that meets advanced international and domestic standards.
14 ISO14000 ISO 14000 certificate awarded after passage of the qualification test. 
